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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

Kenneth L. Y ourd *

T

HE prime objective of the Securities Exchange Act1 is the
establishment and maintenance of a free and open market for
trading in securities; a free and open market in the sense that the
prices obtaining thereon represent an evaluation of worth based upon a
full knowledge in all traders of all pertinent facts and circumstances.
In an attempt to achieve a realization of the ideal concept of a free
and open market, the framers of the Securities Exchange Act have
been careful to bring within the purview of the enactment all elements
which they believed in any way were reflected in the market appraisal
of traded securities, and to extend the control of the act to all persons
who they believed might in any manner influence the evaluation, by the
market, of traded securities. Section 16 of the act, while it amounts
to a complete unit in itself, is but one cog in this larger scheme devised
to control the securities markets of the country.
The place of section 16 in the statutory scheme is apparent. Directors, officers and substantial stockholders of corporations whose securities are listed on the exchanges, by reason of their inside position, have
access to information not available to the market generally, and, by
reason of their managerial control, have the ability to pervert the
corporate action for the sole purpose of influencing the price of its
securities. When and if advantage is taken of this special knowledge
and ability for the particular benefit of one or a few insiders, and
they trade in the securities of the corporation on the basis thereof, the
result is a market in the security which does not represent the true
appraisal of its value.
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act is a blanket provision
predicated on the thesis that all directors, officers and substantial stock-

* A.B., J.D., Michigan; LL.M., Harvard; member of Illinois and Massachusetts
bars.-Ed.
1
48 Stat. L. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. (1935), § 78a et seq.
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holders, whether they have abused their position or not, should be
deprived of their ability to do so to the detriment of the market. The
section has- established for the management and those in control of the
larger corporations of the United States a new standard of conduct far
beyond that required by prior statutory or case law. The provision restricts officers and directors to their duties as officers and directors. It
restricts the substantial stockholder to being a stockholder for the
purposes of investment or control. The intent of the section is that no
longer shall the officer or director be in his private life a speculator in
the shares of his company. And, no longer shall the substantial stockholder toy with the market in the stock of his company. The result is
that the burdens of the enactment fall equally upon the most exemplary
of the insiders as well as upon those who would abuse their trust. 2
SECTION

16(a): REPORTING

The section employs three di:fferent sanctions to insure compliance
on the part of the persons sought to be controlled. The standard criminal penalty and a newly designed civil liability are availed of. In addition, the powerful compulsion of publicity is employed as the third
sanction.
.
Section I 6, as a whole, applies to the following three classes of
persons:
8
I. Those who are, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owners
of more than ten per cent of any class of any equity security which is
registered on a national securities exchange.~
2
Until legal action or Congressional investigation brings_ the facts to light one
cannot always determine who of the insiders falls into which class. Sometimes those
thought to be most exemplary in conduct turn out to be the ones who have taken
greatest undue advantage of a trust. See, for example, mention of the pool operations of
Albert H. Wiggin in Chase National Bank stock while Chairman of the Governing
Board of the Chase National Bank, in Report of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency on Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP. 1455, 73rd Cong., 2d sess., pp.
62, 63 (1934), and testimony of Albert H. Wiggin in Hearings of same Committee,
S. HEARINGS ON S. RES. 84, 56 and 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pts. 5 and 6 (1933).
8
The term ''beneficial owner" is not defined in the Exchange Act. It has, however,
been the subject of opinions by the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See, SEC Release No. 79 (Jan. 13, 1935) (persons controlling a holding
company; partners in partnership owning listed securities; trustees of a personal trust
owning listed securities); SEC Release No. 175 (April 16, 1935) (status of husband as
the beneficial owner of securities held by wife). The term "substantial stockholder''
will herein be used as meaning "the beneficial owner of more than 10%" of an equity
security.
4
A national securities exchange is a stock exchange which has registered under
section 6 of the Exchange Act.
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Directors 5 of any corporation 6 which has one or more classes
of its equity securities registered on a national securities exchange.
3. Officers' of any corporation which has one or more classes of its
securities registered on a national securities exchange.
Each of these persons is required, by subsection (a) of section I 6,
to file at the time of the registration of the security, or within ten
days after he assumes the status of officer, director or beneficial owner,
a statement with the stock exchange on which the security is listed 8
( and a duplicate with the Securities and Exchange Commission) of the
amount of all equity securities, of the same corporation, of which he is
the beneficial owner. 0 Subsequent statements must be filed within ten
days after the close of each calendar month upon any change in ownership, occurring during the month. 10 No subsequent report need be made
if there is no change of ownership.
2.

5 "The term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." Securities Exchange Act, § 3a (7).
6 The term corporation as here used is not strictly correct, as section l 6 refers to
a "director or an officer of the issuer of such security." "Issuer" is defined to mean any
person who issues a security. And "person" is defined as an individual, a corporation,
a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organization. 48 Stat. L. 883, § 3a (8) (9), 15 U.S. C. (1935), § 78c (8) (9).
"Corporation" will be used herein as synonymous with the statutory term "issuer."
7 The term "officer" means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, or any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers. SEC Rule
X-3B-2.
8 Section 16 does not apply to securities admitted to unlisted trading privileges on
an exchange. Although section 12(f} of the Exchange Act states that a security for
which unlisted trading privileges are continued or extended shall be deemed to be
registered on a national securities exchange, it also empowers the commission to exempt
such securities from the operation of sections 13, 14 or 16 of the act by rule or regulation. By Rule X-12F-4(c) the commission has exempted from the operation of section
16 unlisted securities, the issuer of which has no equity security registered as a listed
security on any national securities exchange. Where the issuer does have an equity
security listed on an exchange, the unlisted security is exempt from the operation
of section 16 as applied to a 10% owner, if such 10% owner is neither a director nor
an officer of the issuer corporation nor the owner of 10% of any class of an equity
security which is registered as a listed security.
9
The term "beneficial owner'' as distinguished from owner of record is purposely
used in the statute. The presently used terminology makes the statute inapplicable to
banks when acting as agents or trustees for principals whose securities are registered
in the name of a nominee, or to brokers who have no ownership in stock carried in
their names. See testimony of W. C. Potter, Chairman of the Board, Guaranty Trust
Co., S. HEARINGS ON S. REs. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 15, p. 7226
(1934). Odd-lot dealers making purchases in the course of their business are specifically exempted from the provisions of section 16 by RuLE X-16A-5.
10
The General Counsel for the commission has written in an advisory opinion that
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The statute uses the term "equity security." This designation has
been adopted to encompass a wider class of securities than that comprehended by the words "stocks" or "shares," but yet to exclude those
securities which are definitely classed as bonds or debentures. By statutory definition "equity security" means any stock or similar security,
any bond or debenture convertible into stock or carrying subscription
warrants or rights for stock, or, subscription warrants or rights alone.11
In addition, the term has been given added flexibility in that the commission is authorized and empowered to designate, by such rules and
regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, any other security of similar nature as
an equity security. Thus, section I 6 applies not only to those securities
which are the evidence of a proprietary interest in a corporation, but
also to those securities through which a proprietary interest in the corporation may be obtained.12
It is to be observed that a report is required of every officer and
every director of a 'corporation which has any class of its equity securities registered on a national securities exchange, regardless of whether
or not he owns any of the listed securities and without regard to the
amount of such securities he owns. 13 The beneficial owner, on the other
hand, is required to file a report only if he owns more than ten per
cent of the registered equity security. If he does not own more than
ten per cent of the registered equity security, he need not file a report
regardless of the amount of his holdings in the unregistered equity
securities of that .issuer. If he does own more than ten per cent of the
registered class of securities he must then report all holdings, of whatever amount, of all other equity securities of that issuer, whether
registered or not.14
The commission has prescribed by rule the manner in which it is
to be determined whether a person is the beneficial owner of more
an officer, director or stockholder is to be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of a security at the time when he takes a firm commitment for the purch.ase
thereof, and to divest himself of such beneficial ownership at the time when he takes
a firm commitment for the sale thereof. SEC Release.No. n6 (Mar. 9, 1935).
11
48 Stat. L. 884, § 3a (II).
12
The terms "stock" or "shares" will be used hereinafter, when referring to
section 16, in the light of this statutory definition.
18
The original Fletcher-Rayburn Bill required directors and officers to report only
if they owned 5% of the class of securities which were registered. S. HEARINGS ON
S. REs. 84, 56 and 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 15, p. 6555 (1934). This was altered
in the final bill.
14
48 Stat. L. 896, § 16(a), 15 U. S. C. (1935), § 78 p (a), and SEC Rule
X-16A-1 (b).
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than ten per cent of a~y class of any listed equity security.15 The basis
of determination is the amount of such class of security which has been
issued, without regard to the total authorization and without regard to
whether the full amount issued is registered on the exchange. Treasury
shares are to be included in determining the amount issued.16 Simple
forms on which report is to be made have been prescribed by the commission and have been in use for several years.11 The rules of the commission require each person reporting, if he be the indirect beneficial
owner of any equity security, to specify the nature of such beneficial
ownership 18 althdugh the privilege is given to the person filing the
report to declare that he does not admit that he is the beneficial owner
of any of the equity securities covered by the report.19
The reports required by section I 6 (a) are filed with the exchange
on which the security is registered for trading. Where the security is
traded on more than one exchange, the issuer corporation has the privilege of designating the one exchange where the reports are to be filed. 20
Duplicates are also required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The reports are public documents and, as such,
are available for public inspection both at the exchanges and at the
office of the commission in Washington, D. C. In addition, the commission compiles and publishes semi-monthly an "Official Summary
of Security Transactions and Holdings of Directors, Officers, and
Principal Stockholders," copies of which are available to the public at
each regional office of the commission and at each exchange.21 The
15

SEC Rule X-16A-2.
In determining the percentage of ownership of voting trust certificates or certificates of deposit for equity securities, the class is deemed to consist of the entire
amount of voting trust certificates or certificates of deposit issuable in respect of the
class of equity security which may be deposited regardless of whether or not all such
securities have been deposited. Id.
17
Three types of report forms are now in use. Form 4 is to be used for the
monthly report when a change in holdings has occurred during the month. Form 5
is for use upon the registration of a security. Form 6 is to be returned when a person
becomes a 10% owner, officer or director. See SEC Rule X-16A-1. The forms are
reproduced in l PRENTICE-HALL, SECURITIES REGULATION SERVICE, 3d ed.,
l 2,04112,059 (1937), and in CCH STOCK E-x;cHANGE REGULATION SERVICE, 1[1[6504-6506.
18
SEC Rule X-16A-3 (a).
19
SEC Rule X-16A-3 (c).
20
SEC Rule X-16A-1 (£).
21
SEC, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1937). Copies of the summary are also
widely distributed among newspaper correspondents, individual investors and other
interested persons. Included in the official summary are the reports required under
section 17(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. L. 830 (1935),
I 5 U. S. C. (Supp. l 93 8), § 79 q (a), to be filed by officers and directors of registered
16

mr
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practice of the commission has been to establi~h a separate file in its
Washington offices for each person reporting on holdings of each
separate issue. 22 The result is that there exists, in the offices of this
administrative agency, a fairly complete file of the stockholdings of the
leaders of American business and industry. According to the commission's figures, at the close of the fiscal year on June 30, 1938, 35,529
such files had been established for 25,843 different persons who had
filed with the commission a grand total of ro9,732 reports.28 The
commission states that there have been only thirty-four known cases
of failure to file reports when the situation required. 24 This unusual
voluntary compliance perhaps goes to demonstrate that the American
business man is willing to cooperate after all. Perhaps, however, it
merely demonstrates that the sanctions available to· enforce reporting
are sufficiently potent to beget compliance.25
From this consideration of subsection I 6 (a), it is apparent that
a completely new affirmative duty of disclosure has been imposed upon
those persons managing and controlling the larger businesses and indusholding companies concerning their holdings of all securities of the registered holding
company and its subsidiaries.
22
SEC, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1937).
28
SEC, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1938).
2
"' The commission says in its FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT (p. 68) that only 34
delinquencies were revealed after it had made an investigation of the extent of compliance with section 16(a), and that the reason these delinquencies remain is that it has
been unable after exhaustive search to locate the persons who should have (in its
opinion) made the reports; and that many of the companies, in relation to the securities
of which the reports are required, have been dissolved or their registration of securities
withdrawn. These figures of the commission show that there is only about one delinquent in every 1000 persons who should report.
25
Section 16(a) places an affirmative duty on persons subject to it by requiring
that such persons "shall file" the stated reports. Section 32(a) of the act in turn
imposes substantial criminal penalties for the wilful violation of any provision of the
Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, the observance of which is required.
The same section also imposes like penalties for the wilful making of any false or misleading statement with respect to any material fact in any report or document required
to be filed under the act.
In addition, an untruthful report may subject the maker to a civil liability under
section 18(a) of the act. This section says that "Any person who shall make or cause
to be made any statement in any •.•report, or document filed pursuant to this title •.•
which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it
was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any
person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon
~uch statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected
by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall
prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false
or misleading." 48 Stat. L. 897, 15 U.S. C. (1935), § 78 r (a).
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tries of the country. This small portion of the Securities Exchange Act
takes it place with those other portions of the Exchange Act and the
Securities Act which have produced a notable ventilation of corporate
affairs, as they relate to corporate securities. Section I 6 (a) adds to the
statutory mandate that all must be told about the security, the further
mandate that all must be toldaboutwhatthecorporateinsiders are doing
with the security. In so far as publicity of trading activity is itself a
deterrent to the use of inside corporate information for selfish ends,
section I 6 (a) alone will correct some of the former abusive practices
of corporate officers, directors and principal stockholders. In so far as
mere disclosure is unavailing as an effective sanction, the further provisions of section r6 may be of some value in achieving the objective.
SECTION r6(b) AND THE CoMMON LAw
Section r6(b) was devised to deprive the corporate officer, director
or substantial stockholder of any incentive to trade actively in the
shares of his company by removing the profit from all such transactions involving a purchase and sale or sale and purchase within any
period of less than six months. Irrespective of the intention of such
officer, director or substantial stockholder in entering into the purchase
or sale, the statute provides that the profit resulting therefrom is recoverable by the issuer of the security traded or by the owner of any
security of the issuer suing in the name of the issuer corporation.u
The civil sanction of section I 6 (b) impinges upon the somewhat
diverse and controversial body of judge-made law concerning the
dealings of corporate officers and directors with individual stockholders.
I refer to the decisions treating of the duty of an officer or director of
a corporation to disclose the full and true basis for his action when he
seeks to purchase the shares of the company from an individual stockholder.
A preponderant majority of the courts, including the courts of
practically all the financial and industrial states, have held flatly that
an officer or director of a corporation does not sustain a fiduciary relation to an individual stockholder with respect to his stock and that,
consequently, the mere failure on the part of the officer or director
to disclose inside information will not militate against him so long as
he does not actively mislead the seller or perpetrate a fraud. 27 The
2
G Several hypothetical situations pointing out the fringes where the application
of subsections I 6 (a) and I 6 (b) is questionable are set forth in Seligman, "Problems
Under the Securities Exchange Act," 21 VA. L. REv, I (1934).
21
The leading cases are Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 581 (1868);
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many courts expounding this viewpoint have invariably stated that,
while the directors and officers of a corporation are trustees for the
corporation and the stockholders as a body when acting as representatives of the corporation in the management of its affairs, such relationship extends no further; and that when a director or officer buys or
sells the stock of the corporation he is as free to deal with a stockholder
as any stranger. This, even though he has taken advantage of knowledge gained through his official position without disclosing it.28
On the other hand, a relatively small body of judicial authority
in some of the agricultural states has promulgated the doctrine that
directors and officers stand in a fiduciary relationship to the stockholders of the corporation and that this prevents their trading at arm's
length with any stockholder 29 and requires a full disclosure of all
material facts affecting the value of the shares. so This viewpoint has
been enthusiastically championed by the legal textbook and periodical
writers.81 In fact, in the last thirty years only one of the many articles
Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873);
Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. (67 Tenn.) 108 (1874). The rule has been followed in
Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, Washington. The cases are collected in 84 A. L. R. 615 (1933).
28
This rule, of course, does not apply where fraud or active misrepresentation or
the abuse of a special agency is involved.
29
The leading case is Oliver v. Oliver, II8 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903);
followed in Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. The rule of disclosure
applies to facts only. It may be overridden by the primary duty to the corporation to keep
the information secret. In this event it has been said that the very fact the director cannot disclose prevents him from dealing with one who does not know and to whom
the information cannot be made known. Oliver v. Oliver, supra. See also, mention of
the point in Berle, "Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock," 25
MICH. L. REV. 827 at 837 (1927).
so Where a director purchases from a co-director or officer to whom the same
information is available, the rule does not apply. Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 25
N. E. 636 (1890). See also, SPELLMAN, CoRPORATE DIRECTORS 616 (1931), citing
Steinfeld v. Nielson, 15 Ariz. 424 at 446, 139 P. 879 (1914).
81
3 PoMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed.,§ 1090 (1918); Berle, "Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock," 25 MICH, L. REV. 827 (1927)
[being also chapter 9 in BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF CoRPORATION FINANCE
(1928)]; Bigelow, "The Relation of Directors of a Corporation to Individual Shareholders," 81 CENT. L. J. 256 (1915); Collier, "Liabilities of Directors and of
Trustees of Beneficial Owners Compared," 74 CENT. L. J. 360 (1912); Laylin,
"The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock," 27 YALE L. J. 731 (1918);
Smith, "Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," 19
MICH, L. REv. 698 (1921); Thornton, "The Trust Relation Between Corporate
Officers and Stockholders Buying of, or Selling Their Stock to Them," 67 CENT,
L. J. 452 (1908); Wilgus, "Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a
Shareholder," 8 MICH, L. REv. 267 (1910); IO CoRN. L. Q. 509 (1925); 19
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in the legal periodicals treating of the conflict has espoused the viewpoint prevailing in most of the courts. 82
There is no more persuasive statement of the viewpoint of the
minority than in the parent case of this line of authority, Oliver v.
Oliver. 38 This case dealt with a transaction in which the defendant,
who was both president and a director of the Gate City Oil Company,
secured an option to purchase the shares of minority stockholders at a
price of $ I IO a share. At the time the option was taken a contemplated
sale of the company's plant on beneficial terms made the stock actually
worth $ I 85 per share. This information was not disclosed by the defendant to the optioners. As soon as the sale of the plant was definitely
agreed upon the defendant took up his option with the result that he
netted a substantial profit. The plaintiff minority stockholders were
successful in their suit to recover this profit. The court, sitting in
equity, started from the premise that a director or officer is a trustee
for the corporation which employs him and in this capacity serves the
interests of the entire body of stockholders, his actual employers. Then,
says the court, the fact that he is trustee for all is not to be perverted
into a holding that the director or officer is under no obligation to
each. And, the fact that he must serve the corporation does not warrant him in becoming the active and successful opponent of an individual stockholder with reference to the latter's undivided interest in
the very property committed to his care. The court does not contend
that the director or officer is technically a trustee in the strict sense.
It calls him a quasi or sub-modo trustee. The following is the statement
of the court's position:
"It might be that the director is in possession of information
which his duty to the company requires him to keep secret; and
if so he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his
obligation to the company overrides that to an individual holder
of the stock. But if the fact so known to the director can not be
published it does not follow that he may use it to his own advantage, and to the disadvantage of one whom he also represents.
The very fact that he can not disclose prevents him from dealing
CoRN. L. Q. 103 (1933); 20 CoRN. L. Q. 101 (1934); 45 HARV. L. REv. 1374
at 1389 (1932); 32 M1cI-I. L. REv. 678 (19,4); 14 MINN. L. REv. 530 (1930);
II Wis. L. REV. 547 (1936); 46 YALE L. J. 143 (1937).
82
Walker, "The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from his
Stockholders," 32 YALE L. J. 637 (1923); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs
perm. ed.,§ 1174 (1931), adopts Mr. Walker's analysis of the cases and espousal of th;
majority rule.
88

118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903).
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with one who does not know, and to whom material information
can not be made known. If, however, the fact within the knowledge of the director is of a character calculated to affect the selling price, and can, without detriment to the interests of the company, be imparted to the shareholder, the director, before he buys,
is bound to make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the information is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is as much
entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset as to any other
regularly entered on the list of the company's holdings. . . .
Where the director obtains the information giving added value to
the stock by virtue of his official position, he holds the information
in trust for the benefit of those who placed him where this knowledge was obtained, in the well-founded expectation that the same
should be used first for the company, and ultimately for those who
were the real owners of the company. The director can not deal
on this information to the prejudice of the artificial being which
is called the corporation, nor on any sound principle can he be
permitted to act differently toward those who are not artificially,
but actually interested." 8 4,
The Georgia court, at a further point in its opinion in the Oliver
case, in speaking of the components of market value, used words which
might very well have been uttered within the last few years by the
Securities and Exchange Commission itself. The court said:
"It is matter of common knowledge that the market value of
shares rises and falls, not only because of an increase or decrease
in tangible property, but by reason of real or contemplated action
on the part of managing officers; declaring or passing dividends;
the making of fortunate or unfortunate contracts; the loss or
gain of property in dispute; profitable or disadvantageous sales
or leases. And to say that a director who has been placed where
he himself may raise or depress the value of the stock, or in a
position where he first knows of facts which may produce that
result, may take advantage thereof, and buy from or sell to one
whom he is directly representing, without making a full disclosure
and putting the stockholder on an equality of knowledge as to
these facts, would offer a premium for faithless silence, and give a
reward for the suppression of truth." 85
This point of view, it must be admitted, is ethically sound. It
represents an increasing social consciousness in respect to transactions
of the business world. The decisions of the majority, on the other hand,
s4, Ibid., II8 Ga. at 368.
Ibid., II 8 Ga. at 3 70.

85
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are the epitome of the laissez-faire doctrine of free and unrestricted
trading under all circumstances.
The advent of the "fiduciary duty" doctrine and the harshness of
a sheer denial of any such duty in many cases has led to a third line of
decisions consonant with and intermediary between the two extremes.
In these cases the so-called "special circumstances" doctrine has been
applied. First announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strong
v. Repide,36 it holds that, even if the relationship is admittedly not a
fiduciary one, where the circumstances are peculiar and special facts
make it inequitable for the director to take advantage of the shareholder, he will not be permitted to do so. 87
This group of decisions, representing three divergent points of view
on the single problem of the relationship between the corporate managers and the individual shareholder, stands in contrast to the statutory
solution of the same problem in section I 6 (b). An explanation of the
uncertainty of the one and the absoluteness of the other may more
clearly appear on a comparison of the one with the other with first a view
to the genesis of each.
THE STATUTE AND THE COMMON LAW COMPARED

Section I 6 (b), in its first line, states that an absolute prohibition of
trading, and civil liability therefor, is imposed "for the purpose of
preventing the unfair use of information which may have been· obtained" by reason of the relationship of the officer, director or sub213 U.S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521 (1909).
Strong v. Repide, supra, involved a defendant who was owner of three-fourths
of the stock of the Philippine Development Company, and who was in addition one of
the five directors and agent and administrator general of the company, and who
represented the company in negotiations for the sale of its lands to the United States.
The plaintiff was a woman who owned 800 shares of stock in the company (total
issued shares, 42,030) and who had placed them in the hands of an agent with power
to sell. The defendant, during the negotiations with the United States government for
the sale of the company's lands to it, and while he was holding out for a higher price,
pw:chased the plaintiff's shares through an agent. The defendant's agent misrepresented
as to the identity of his principal. The purchase price of plaintiff's shares was oneeighth of what they were worth after the sale of the company lands was completed.
The defendant concealed all facts relating to the sale of company lands, even concealing
his identity as the true purchaser of the plaintiff's shares. The judgment of the Court
of First Instance at Manila for substantial money damages, or rescission of the transaction, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said,
"It is here sought to make defendant responsible for his actions, not alone and simply
in his character as a director, but because, in consideration of all the existing circumstances above detailed, it became the duty of the defendant, acting in good faith, to
state the facts before making the purchase." 213 U.S. 419 at 431.
86

87
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stantial stockholder to the corporation. But, as has been heretofore
pointed out, behind this purpose lies the larger and predominant design to protect the securities markets from untoward influences. Thus
it is, that the fulfillment of the primary objective results in a beneficial
effect on the relationship between the small individual stockholder and
those who control and manage his corporation. The case law, on the
other hand, has approached the problem through the plaint of the
small individual stockholder, who having been duped has come crying
to the court seeking only a reparation for the injury which he feels has
been inflicted upon him; or, rather, seeking the profits he thinks he
might have made had he been possessed of the inside knowledge that
his vendee had.88
In this approach, it is submitted, lies the explanation for the multitude of differences between the statutory sanction and the existing case
law. Herein also lies a compelling reason why the statutory provision
should be merely supplementary to and should not supplant the
common law.
A first important difference between the statutory and decisional
remedies is the fact that section r 6 is concerned only with securities
listed for trading upon the national securities exchanges. The statutory
liability, therefore, arises only against officers, directors or substantial
stockholders in corporations whose securities are listed on the registered
stock exchanges. There were 2,485 such companies on June 30, 1938.89
These issuers of securities included most of the leading nationally
known companies in the United States as well as many with activities
of a sectional or local character.40 But numerically they represent only
a fractional percentage of the total number of corporations in the United
States.41 As to the officers, directors and substantial stockholders of those
companies whose securities are traded in the established over-thecounter markets, or, as in the case of the smaller, closely held companies, directly between buyer and seller, section r6 has no application.
88

The facts of the Oliver case, stated supra at note 33, and of the Strong case,
stated in note 36, supra, illustrate this.
39
This figure includes not only stocks but bonds as well. As of June 30, 1938,
the total number of listed stock issues was 2,847 and the total number of listed bond
issues was 1,467. SEC, FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1938).
40
SEC, FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT 24 (1938).
41
In 1935 the total number of corporation income tax returns filed with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was 533,512. 164,142 returns reported net income,
31 2,858 returns reported no net income, and 56, 5 12 returns were from inactive
corporations. U. S. DEPT. CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AnsTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES
184, table No. 188 (1937) (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce).
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In regard to those companies whose shares are listed on an exchange, section I 6 (b) imposes on the officers, directors and substantial
stockholders an absolute liability as a result of the purchase and sale
of the corporation's shares within a six months period without regard
to intent, circumstances, or the relation of the parties. 42 On the sole
point of imposition of liability the statutory sanction is far advanced
beyond the judge-made law. In the cases applying the above-stated
majority rule, no liability at all results from a purchase by an officer
or director of shares from a stockholder. 43 A fortiori, no liability results
from purchases from or sales to others. Under the "special circumstances" doctrine, liability results only when the shares are purchased
from a stockholder and only if, in addition, special circumstances are
proved which in equity and good conscience require an accounting of
the profits.44
Under the authority of the few cases asserting that there is a
fiduciary relationship between the insider and the ordinary stockholder, liability for the profits accruing from the purchase results upon
proof of the relationship. But it is also necessary to prove that there
was some knowledge possessed by the insider which would have
affected the price at which the transaction took place had it been disclosed.45 And the liability arises only in transactions between an officer
42

The only exception to this blanket imposition of liability is this: "unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted .•••"
48
See cases cited supra, note 27.
"The special circumstances which took Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29
S. Ct. 521 (1909), discu~ed supra at note 36, out of the general rule and rendered the
purchasing director liable to the shareholder were: (I) the defendant was a director
of the corporation whose shares were involved; (2) he owned a majority of the stock;
(3) he was the chief negotiator of a sale _of the property of the corporation, which sale
was the sole cause of the difference between the real and apparent value of the stock
at the time of the transaction; (4) he was also, at the time, administrator general of the
company; (5) the negotiations were for the sale of substantially all of the property of
the corporation; ( 6) through the acquiescence of the stockholders he was acting substantially as their agent in the sale of the stock; (7) he concealed his identity as purchaser from the plaintiff.
Circumstances substantially akin to these have been found by the courts following this case. In addition, many of the cases ostensibly based on the special circumstances doctrine have involved actual fraud. See, Smith, "Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," 19 MtcH. L. REV. 698 (1921) (wherein
the cases from Strong v. Repide to 1921 are reviewed.)
45
See note 29, supra. The cases up to 1909 are reviewed in Wilgus, "Purchase
of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," 8 M1cH. L. REv. 267
(1910), and from then to 1921 in Smith, "Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a
Director from a Shareholder," 19 M1cH. L. REV. 698 (1921).
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or director and a stockholder of the same company. As ·to all others,4 6
freedom of trading is the rule. 47
In those cases in which liability might have been imposed under the
special circumstances doctrine, or even under the fiduciary rule, a further strong defensive argument sometimes has proved upsetting where
the securities were traded upon an exchange. This is the practical argument that purchase and sales of securities on a stock exchange are impersonal affairs effected through brokers; that neither the actual buyer or
the actual seller have any personal relation whatever; that each individually and without influence from the other determines his own
course of action; 48 that therefore there is no such relationship between
the parties as would justify an action by one against the other.
So it appears that, viewed in the light of the all-inclusive liability
imposed by section r6(b), the common law is comparatively weak and
ineffectual in regard to disclosure of corporate information by officers
and directors and with respect to the use or misuse of inside information in trading in the corporation's securities, even with the other
stockholders of the corporation. And as applied to the existence of any
such duties in the substantial stockholders, the case law is non-existent. 40 ·
Including transactions between director and director. See note 30, supra.
Subject, of course, to the ordinary restraints of the law.
48 This is the position regarding exchange transactions taken by the late Mr.
Roberts Walker in his article, "The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing
Stock from His Stockholders," 32 YALE L. J. 637 (1923). This, also, was an influencing factor which led the court to find that there were no special circumstances
justifying a recovery in Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933),
where the stock was listed on the Boston Curb Exchange. The Massachusetts court,
formerly a?- exponent of the no liability rule, now follows the special circumstances
doctrine.
The defensive argument is also available as against the application of the fiduciary
duty rule, but no case has been found in which it was urged, for the very simple
reason that none involved securities listed on a stock exchange.
9
'
As noted hereinbefore, the beneficial owners of more than 10% of any registered
equity security of a corporation are subject to the duties and liabilities of section 16.
The common law imposes no such duty on one who is purely a stockholder; although
liability has been imposed where as a result of his stock holdings the defendant has been
enabled to deceive the minority holders, or where the large stockholder is also an
officer or director. See, Dunnett v. Arn, (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 912; cf.
Roby v. Dunnett, (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 68; Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N. Y.
107, 179 N. E. 310 (1932).
The theory behind the statute is that often the substantial stockholder is as much
in actual control of the corporation as the officers and directors, and sometimes more
so, and as a result equally in a position to gain or profit from inside information. The
explanation for the reluctance of even the most liberal courts to impose a duty on a
stockholder who holds no official position in the corporation lies in the fact that to
46
47
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Upon further analysis, however, it is apparent that the statutory
liability of section I 6 (b) was not designed for and is not applicable to
most of the type situations which have been and are being dealt with
by the application of the common law. 50 An important item of the
section is that applying the liability only when there has been a purchase and sale or sale and purchase of an equity security within a period
of less than six months. The mere fact of a purchase or of a sale of an
equity security will not authorize suit under section I 6 (b), regardless
of the circumstances of the purchase or sale and regardless of the person from or to whom the purchase or sale is made. The most flagrant
instance of an unconscionable profit resulting from corporate manipulation and non-disclosure of inside information plus fraud and deceit
would justify >no action under the statute-unless a sale or purchase
of the same equity security 51 was also completed within the six months
label him even a quasi-fiduciary requires too much of a stretch of the technicalities of
the legal logic.
~
50
In Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904), the defendant was
president of a bank which had not declared dividends on its stock for several years.
During that time he gradually acquired the stock at cheap prices and. the bank thereafter declared a dividend of 120%. The ,purpose of acquisition was to benefit from
control and subsequent dividends. There was no attempt to resell. In Strong v. Repide,
213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521 (1909), discussed supra at note 36, the defendant
managing officer and director of a land company was negotiating a sale of the major
portion of its lands at an advantageous price which would greatly increase the liquidating
value of its shares and during the pendency of the negotiations purchased plaintiff's
stock at a low price. There was no indication of a design to resell the shares purchased.
In Westwood v. Continental Can Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) So F. (2d) 494, Westwood, who was a director, vice-president and general manager of Southwestern Can
Co., sought to purchase the stock of the company in order to get sufficient control to
liquidate it and at liquidation sale sell its assets to the Continental Can Co., with a
resulting profit to himself. There was here no plan involving resale of the stock within
6 months of the purchase. In Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310
(1932), and in Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929
(1916), the managing and controlling officers sold their stock to a third person or
corporation at a generous price and led the minority stockholders to sell their shares
for a much smaller amount. Again, in these cases, no purchase and resale of stock took
place.
51
The original Fletcher-Rayburn bill made it unlawful for any director, officer
or substanti:1- owner to "purchase any such registered security with the intention or
expectation of selling the same security within 6 months" and provided that the profit
resulting from any transaction in such security extending over a period of less than 6
months should inure to the issuer. To make certain what transactions were to be covered
the original bill further said, "irrespective of the certificates for such security received
or delivered by such person during such period." This latter clause was to prevent a
defendant claiming freedom from liability on the ground that the identical shares were
not bought and sold within the statutory period. See testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran,
S. HEARINGS ON S. RES. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess., part 15, pp. 6556, 6557
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52

period. At common law, the same fact situation would justify an action
for fraud and deceit, or if the facts did not warrant such action, a suit
to recover the profits or rescind the transaction under either the fiduciary or special circumstance doctrines. 53
This single, but important, feature of the statutory provision adds
much weight to the conclusion that it is only as a secondary result that
section I 6 (b) steps into the field of judicial regulation of the relationship between insiders and stockholders; that it is not the isolated
purchase or sale over which control is sought; but, that the situation
at which the provision is aimed is active buying and selling on the
market which takes advantage of short term swings. As long as equity
securities are acquired for purposes of investment or control, section
I 6 (b) is not concerned with the circumstances of the acquisition.
But the most important and complete point of di:ff erence between
the statute and the common law on this subject is to be found in a comparison of the remedies provided by each. At common law, the stock( I 934). The last above-mentioned clause was omitted from the final bill, but it is
suggested that the intention remains the same because the statute, as it stands today,
uses more comprehensive phraseology in the initial portion of section 16(b). It says
"any profit realized •.. from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer. . . ." Thus, it will probably be held that the identical
security need not be purchased and sold within the period in order that the section
operate.
However, an officer, director or substantial stockholder is not liable for the profits
on a transaction involving two different classes of equity securities of the same issuer.
The words "an equity security" have been unofficially interpreted by the commission
to include only any share of a single class of equity securities of an issuer. I PRENTICEHALL, SECURITIES REGULATION SERVICE, 3d ed., 1f II,685 (1937).
52 ln addition, the statute provides that it shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of any registered
equity security was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or sale and
purchase, of the security involved; or, any transaction or transactions which the commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purposes
of subsection 16(b). The commission has by rule exempted certain distributing and
underwriting transactions (SEC Rule X-16B-2) and transactions in connection with
stock option plans (SEC Rule X-16B-3).
53
Instances wherein section l 6 (b) would apply are: ( l) Where the insider buys
shares on his knowledge of an important pending development which when announced
will raise the market price of the shares, with a view to reselling in the market when
the price has gone up. This was the situation in Goodwin v. Agassiz, 293 Mass. 3 58,
186 N. E. 659 (1933). (2) Where the insider contracts to acquire and sell all of the
shares of his company to an outside purchasing corporation and acquires the shares of
individual stockholders at a low price, reselling to the purchaser at a profit, as in Porter
v. Healy, 244 Pa. St. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914), if the resale is within six months of the
purchase.
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holder is the proper party plaintiff, for he was a party to the transaction and the person to whom the injury, if any, resulted. The stockholder, also, is the one to whom the recovery is awarded by the common law, for he is the one who was deprived of a possible profit.H
In contrast, section 16(b) places the right of action in the corporation whose securities were the subject of the dealing. The only right
of the stockholder/ 5 under the statute, is to institute suit in the name
of the corporation if it refuses to act upon demand or fails to prosecute
diligently a suit once started. 56 And the recovery goes, not to the stockholder, or to any security holder, but into the corporate treasury.
Thus, under the statute the recovery is obtained for the benefit
of one who was not a party to the transaction, in a suit brought in the
name of one who was not a party to the transaction and probably insti54
See Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. St. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914); Sautter v. Fulmer,
258 N. Y. 107, 179 N. E. 310 (1932); Keeley v. Black, 91 N. J. Eq. 520, III A.
22 (1920); Dunnett v. Arn, (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 912; SPELLMAN,
CoRPORATE D1REcToRS 617 (1931); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRAT10Ns,
perm. ed.,§§ u68, u71 (1931); 20 CoRN. L. Q. IOI (1934).
55
The statute gives "the owner of any security of the issuer" the right to sue in
the name of the issuer. This means that not only a stockholder or owner of any equity
security, but the owner of any bond, debenture, or other security issued by the corporation may bring the suit.
56 Since the statute makes no reference to the individual right of the stockholder
to sue a director or officer for a profit made from the purchase of his share, the question has been posed, 20 CoRN. L. Q. IOI at 106, note 21 (1934), whether or not the
statute means to preclude shareholders from suing in cases where they formerly had a
right of action at common law. The answer is that the statute does not. The first reason
in answer is that, as has been emphasized hereinabove, the whole purpose and sense
of the statute is that it prevent insiders' market operations; it was not enacted to cover,
and does not cover, the majority of the common-law situations. The second and technical answer is that section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act specifically provides that
the rights and remedies provided therein shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies .that may exist at law or in equity.
The next question raised is somewhat more difficult. It is asked-will the corporation be able to bring an action under the statute when shareholders have already recovered
the director's unlawful profits at common law? Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act states: "but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a
total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of." On a
literal construction of this provision it is apparent that it does not apply to the situation
at issue, because the individual security holder plaintiff is not a person permitted to
maintain a suit in his own right under section I 6(b) and the action therein provided
for recovery of profits is not a suit for "damages." [Cf. sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the
act, both of which provide for recovery of "damages."] Certainly, if the recovery under
section 16(b) is considered as in the nature of a penalty, there is no reason for refusing
the second recovery on the ground of prior satisfaction.
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tuted by one who was not involved. The recovery under the statute
smacks more of being in the nature of a penalty paid for having engaged in a forbidden transaction than of being compensation for an
injury inflicted. For it is difficult to detail any certain injury to a corporation from the fact of active trading in its shares other than that in
some way the liquidity and veracity of the market for its shares might
have been impaired. 57
Some criticism of the statutory provision for disposition of the
recovery has been voiced on the ground that, since the tainted profits
are turned into the corporate treasury, he who was guilty of making
the profits and then deprived of them nevertheless sh~res in the recovery. This is true. But the pro rata share of the benefit apportionable to
the delinquent's interest should rarely be sufficient to justify a desire
to annul the total award. Payment of the recovery to the issuer corporation seems best upon a practical consideration of the other possible
disposition of the unwarranted profits. As already herein emphasized,
the transaction resulting in the application of section I 6 (b) will, more
likely than not, be an active market operation in the shares of the complaining corporation. 58 Such an operation results in many purchases and
sales from and to many di:ff erent persons through brokers. To attempt
a distribution of the total profit among those who sold their shares to
the trading insider is obviously impractical, yet these are the only
57
Although, at times, it may be that i!l preparing the market for his activities the
insider has acted in a manner direttly detrimental to the interests of the corporation.
58 Decisive evidence on this point lies in the declarations of legislative intent in
framing section 16(b). The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in its Report
on Stock Exchanges Practices said, referring to this subsection, S. REP. 145 5, 73d Cong.,
2d sess., p. 68 (1934): "The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 aims to protect the
interest of the public against the predatory operations of directors, officers and principal
stockholders of corporations by preventing them from speculating in the stock of the
corporations to which they owe a fiduciary duty."
At p. 5 5 in the report the committee said: "Among the most vicious practices
unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their
fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust
and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in
their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers,
exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to enable them to
acquire and profit by information not available to others." Illustrative examples of the
type of market activity decried were set out by the committee. These examples were
summaries,,of the pool operations in American Commercial Alcohol, Sinclair Consolidated Oil and General Asphalt, and the operations of A. H. Wiggin in Chase National
Bank Stock, the stories of which were developed at the committee hearings. See also
S. HEARINGS ON S. RES. 84, 56 and 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, pp. 531-548, and
pts. 5, 6, 13 (1934).
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others who can possibly be said to be entitled to share in the proceeds
of the action. 59
An additional reason for designating the corporation as the recipient
of the recovery is that section I 6 (b) was designed to be more of a
deterrent to prevent the undesired trading by taking the profit out of
the transaction than a compensatory enactment to facilitate re-imbursement of those on the other side of the trades. 00
The effectiveness of the subsection depends upon its immediate
application when purchases and sales ( or vice versa) inside of six months
are made by officers, directors, or substantial stockholders. There is a
two-year statute of limitations upon the right to bring action for a recovery of the profits resulting from such sales and it is this two-year limitation which may remove some of the effectiveness of the provision. For
example, if a trading management continues in power it is certain that
these persons will see that no action is initiated against them by the corporation itself. And if such management remains in control for two years
after the market operations have been completed, these persons are, by
reason of the short period of limitation, safe from attack on themselves
by the corporation. The only fear of a management in this position is the
Go If it be said that each person who sold shares to the trading officer, director, or
large stockholder lost an amount equal to the difference between the price at which he
sold his shares to the insider and the price at which that insider resold the same shares;
if the market operations of the trading insider extended over a period of weeks or
months and a substantial volume of trading took place through brokers; if some of the
transactions were short sales and others resulted in loss rather than gain-the practical
impossibility of tracing the transactions and allocating the total recovery is apparent.
Add to this the fact that many of those on the other side of the market may no longer
be owners of the corporation's securities and probably not parties to the action, and the
impracticability of attempting a reimbursement becomes nearly conclusive.
60
Some students of the Exchange Act have questioned the effectiveness of the
civil sanction of section 16(b) as a deterrent and have suggested that a criminal sanction
in its place might have been more effective. If a criminal sanction were used, it has
been suggested that any penalty recovered might be paid over to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. A criminal sanction in place of the present provision for civil
liability would aline subsection (b) with subsections (a) and (c) of section 16, since
both of the other two subsections rely on the enforcing power of the criminal sanction.
In justification of subsection (b), it has been observed that the mere fact of straight
buying and selling of securities can in no sense be said to be such a "bad" act as to
justify imposition of criminal liability. This is particularly true under the blanket
imposition of the 6 months rule, which catches bona fide trades as well as those made
with an unethical purpose.
It is worthy of note that the original Fletcher-Rayburn bill made purchases and
sales within 6 months unlawful, in addition to giving, a civil recovery of the proceeds
to the issuer corporation. See testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, S. HEARINGS ON S.
REs. 84, 56 and 97, pt. 15, pp. 6556, 6557 (1934). This was changed in the bill
as finally enacted.
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possibility that the disgruntled security holder may make demand on the
corporation for action and thereafter sue in behalf of the corporation.
While the provision for a security owner's suit in the name of the corporation may not be e:ffective because, despite the time and expense of
the suit, no direct profit can thereby accrue to the suing security holder,
there is, nevertheless, always the threat of a blackmail suit or a suit which
will serve as a basis for ouster of the management. 61
SECTION

16 (b)

AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Turning now to a consideration of section 16(b) solely from the
point of view of procedure, it becomes apparent that the subsection is
to be read together with the jurisdictional section of the Securities Exchange Act and that as so read section I 6 (b) becomes a remedial statute
with its own jurisdictional provisions.
Section I 6 (b) states ( in part) :
"Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty
days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same
thereafter...."
Section 27 of the act, in turn, provides that:
"The District Courts of the United States, the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title
or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity
61

An interesting speculation is as to the effect the higher standards of conduct
and the duties of corporate reporting and disclosure set by the Securities Act, the
Securities Exchange Act and the Public Utility Holding Company Act will have, if any,
upon the courts when common-law cases of the type herein discussed come before them.
In other words, will the common law follow the statutory law in imposing upon officers
and directors a higher standard of duty than has heretofore been required in the
majority of cases? That there was, prior to the advent of the Securities Acts, some
trend away from the harsh finality of the absolute denial of any duty of. disclosure by
insiders, is evidenced by decisions in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania following the lead of Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521 (1909), discussed
at note 36, supra, and its special circumstances doctrine, although the courts of each of
these states were originally exponents of the majority rule. See the cases of Goodwin
v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1937), McManus v. Durant, 168 App.
Div. 643, 154 N. Y. S. 580 (1915); Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. St. 427, 91 A. 428
(1914).
.
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and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this title and the rules or regulations thereunder."
The latter section also lays the venue for the action in the district
wherein any violative act or transaction occurred or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business.
It is settled, then, that jurisdiction of suits under section 16(b)
lies only, and automatically, in the federal courts. 62 But the act is not
quite so clear as to when the action may be at law and when in equity.
The subsection, on its face, seems to permit the issuer to sue for the
profits either at law or in equity. It is suggested that the words of the
statute should be read as permitting suit by the issuer corporation at
law and suits by a security holder in the name of the issuer in equity.
The action is for a money award, much in the nature of a penalty. A
suit by the issuer corporation, therefore, does not appear to be a matter
within the jurisdiction of equity but rather an action in which the defendant should be able to insist on a trial of the issues before a jury. 68
The action by the security owner in behalf of the issuer corporation, on
the other hand, is a matter for the court of equity since it is a derivative suit; the right which the security owner is seeking to enforce is not
his, hence no common-law court should properly hear him. 64
62
There is no need to comply with the requirements of diversity of citizenship or
jurisdictional amount. See, l LoNGSDORF, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE, §
102 (1928) and Supplement (1938).
63
" • • • whenever a court of law is competent to take cognizance of a right, and
has power to proceed to a judgment which affords a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy, without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must proceed at law, because
the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury." Hipp v. Babin, 19 How.
(60 U.S.) 271 at 278 (1856). See, SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, p. 566 ff., c. 4, § 5 "Jurisdiction in Equity'' (1937); Rule 38, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3001 (1938).
Proceedings to enforce forfeitures are triable by a jury. James, "Trial by Jury and the
New Federal Rules of Procedure," 45 YALE L. J. 1022 at 1023, and cases cited,
therein at note 15 (1936).
Since section 16(b) states that the profits "shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer," it may be that an equitable action for an accounting will lie at the suit of the
corporation.
64
See 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 5944 (1932);
Glenn, "The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances," 33 YALE
L. J. 580 at 582 (1924). Cf. the peculiar position of the stockholder of a corporation
which is entitled to sue for triple damages under the Sherman Act. He cannot bring a
stockholder's suit in equity because such action would deprive the defendant of his
right to a jury. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U. S. 27, 36 S. Ct.
233 (1916). Nor can he sue at law because a stockholder's suit lies only in equity.
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 37 S. Ct.
509 (1917).
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The fact that suit under section I 6 (b) is in the federal courts necessitates an inquiry as to the effect of rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of:
Civil Procedure 65 upon such suits as may be instituted by any security
holder in the name and in behalf of the issuer corporation. Such suit
appears to fall clearly within the terms of rule 23 (b) in that it is "an
action brought to enforce a secondary right." 66 But section 16(b) permits "the owner of any security of the issuer" to sue; and the term
"security," as used in the Securities Exchange Act, is a broad term
indeed. It includes not only stockholders and those who by reason of
holding convertible bonds or debentures may become stockholders, but
bondholders, holders of debentures and like issues as well. 67 Thus,
those standing in a creditor relationship to the corporation by reason
of ownership of its debt obligations are as likely to be plaintiffs under
section I 6 (b) as are those in a proprietary relationship to it. Federal
rule 23 (b) applies to suits by "stockholders" only. It will, therefore,
not apply to suits instituted by one standing in a creditor relationship
to the issuer corporation. In addition, there would seem to be no need
for a stockholder plaintiff to comply with that portion of rule 23 (b)
requiring a denial of collusion.
Federal rule 23 (b) ( which is substantially the former Equity Rule
z7) was designed to prevent collusive suits to obtain federal jurisdic65
"In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more
shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association
refuses to enforce rights which might be properly asserted by it, the complaint shall be
verified by oath and shall aver (I) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the
transaction of which he complains or- that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law and ( z) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the
United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction."
66
The security owner's suit under section 16(b) meets the test of a derivative suit
in that under the statute the forbidden profits "inure" to the corporation, the recovery
is for the corporation only, the security owner can sue only in the name and in behalf of
the corporation and only after demand and refusal by the corporation itself to undertake
litigation.
67
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as
a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited." Securities Exchange Act, § 3 (a) (10).
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tion on the ground of diversity of citizenship.68 Compliance with the
rule is not necessary to the jurisdiction of the court, since the rule goes
not to jurisdiction but only to the manner in which the jurisdiction is
exercised. Non-compliance, therefore, simply exposes the complaint to
dismissal for want of a right to maintain it.69 Since compliance with the
rule is not necessary to jurisdiction, and since the prime reason for
compliance is non-existent when jurisdiction is not based on diversity,
the courts have held that where jurisdiction of the federal court is not
dependent upon diversity of citizenship the rule need not be followed
in so far as it requires negation of collusion.70 Jurisdiction of the action
under section I 6 (b) is automatically vested in the federal courts by the
Securities Exchange Act; 71 diversity of citizenship is not a necessary
prerequisite. It would therefore appear that, whether the suit in the
name and on behalf of the corporation is brought by a stockholder or by
any other type of security holder, there is no need to negative collusion.
Section I 6 (b) itself requires as a condition that the issuer fail or
refuse to bring suit within sixty days after request before the security
owner can sue. Compliance in pleading and proof with this requirement, it is submitted, should be at least the equivalent of compliance
with the requirement of federal rule 23(b) as to demand on the corporation for action. 72 Thus it would seem that in fulfilling the condi2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.05 (1938). Another purpose in the rule
lies in the provision that plaintiff be a shareholder at the time of the transaction of
which he complains. This point is discussed infra at note 74.
69
Venner v. Great Northern R. R., 209 U. S. 24, 28 S. Ct. 328 (1907).
70
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (C. C. N. Y. 1908) 162 F. 954.
71
Section 27, set out supra, pp. 152-153.
72
This portion of rule 23 (b) reads as follows: "The complaint shall also set
forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors
or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the
reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort."
Section 16(b) is stricter than rule 23 in that it only permits the secondary suit
upon failure or refusal of the corporation to act after request. Thus, it appears necessary
to show a demand and refusal under section 16(b). The federal court rule, on the
other hand, is more flexible and permits merely a showing that demand upon the
corporation would have been futile. Conversely, the court rule requires, "if necessary,"
an attempt to secure action from the shareholder, while section 16(b) makes no
specific mention of the necessity to attempt to induce shareholders to take action. It is
conceivable, however, that compliance with the requirement of section 16(b) might
require a showing of resort to demand on shareholders for corporate action.
As to necessity for demand on directors, see gene:rally, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.)
99 (1914); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTJcE 2265-2270 (1938); 13 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 6008 (1932). As to the necessity of applying to stockholders, see generally, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) II2 (1914). There must be an
earnest and honest effort to induce the directors to assert the rights of the corporation.
68
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tions precedent to suit under section 16 (b) the requirement of demand
and refusal set up by the federal rule is automatically met.
The only remaining hindrance to complete harmony between section 16 (b) and the federal rule is that provision of the latter which
states:
ccthe complaint • . . shall aver ( 1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law."
Since the above rule applies only to those standing in a proprietary
relationship to the issuer, 73 it follows that if the suit is instituted by a
security holder standing in a creditor relationship, the only statutory
requirement on this point to be watched is section 16 (b) itself. Section
16(b) permits suit "by the owner of any security of the issuer" without
regard to the time of acquisition of such security. 74 As to a stockholder,
however, will it be said that federal rule 23 (b) limits and restricts the
scope of section 16 (b) in this respect; or will it be said that section
I 6 (b) sets up a special statutory procedure which is sui generis, and
for that reason compliance with the federal rule is not necessary as
rule 23 (b) was intended to apply only to shareholders' derivative
actions as developed by the courts of equity? 75
City of Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 241, 7 S. Ct. 520 (1887). As to the necessary
averments to be made in the complaint regarding attempts to induce action, see analysis
of the cases in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2266, 2267 (1938) ..
73
The decisions under Equity Rule 2 7 and its predecessor Equity Rule 94 are
unquestionably in point in construing this part of Rule 23. There is not any known case
under the present rule or under the predecessor rules wherein one in a creditor position
sought to bring a "stockholder's suit."
a Presumably, ownership of the security at the time that suit is instituted is all
that is required under section I 6 (b). The federal rule required plaintiff to have been
a shareholder at the time of the transaction in order to prevent strike-suits, to prevent collusion between corporation and stockholder in acquiring jurisdiction, and
simply in accordance with the equitable principles that a stockholder is estopped to
question transactions occurring before he became a stockholder. See discussion in 2
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2250-2252 (1938).
It has been suggested that the requirement of stock ownership in rule 23(b) is
part of a rule of procedure, hence not within the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), but that it should not be applied as a procedural
requirement where not necessary to prevent collusive resort to federal jurisdiction. See
37 MICH. L. REV. 773 (1939). The question whether the requirement of federal
rule 23(b) as to stock ownership is procedural or substantive, and whether, under Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, the state law on this point is to apply, was considered in Summers
v. Hearst, (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 986. The requirement was considered
to be one of procedure. The contrary position is taken in note on the case in 37 M1cH.
L. REv. 654 (1939); the case is also discussed in 25 VA. L. REv. 100 (1938).
75
It is suggested that to be safe a bill on behalf of a security owner under section
16(b) should be drawn in compliance with federal rule 23(b) (unless such course is
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SECTION 16(c): SHORT SALES, SALES AGAINST THE Box, AND
ARBITRAGE TRANSACTIONS
This review of the civil sanction contained in section I 6 being
completed, it is pertinent to note that the section includes within its
scope two further items of interest. The first is an absolute prohibition
of short sales and sales against the box by corporate insiders; the second
is a conditional exemption of arbitrage transactions from the provisions
of the section. Section 16(c) makes it unlawful 76 for an officer, director
or substantial stockholder to sell an equity security, directly or indirectly, if he does not own the security sold, or if owning the security,
he does not deliver it against the sale within twenty days. 7 7
As distinguished from the forbidden operations of subsection (b),
the operations prohibited in subsection ( c) are only two specific types
of transactions on the down side of the market. But these two types
of transactions, short sales and sales against the box, are, when engaged in by a corporate insider, considered distinctly reprehensible.
In a sense, a short sale by one in control is a bet against his successful
management; and a sale against the box is, at best, a hedge against his
bad management. 78 In addition, both types of sales, at least according
impossible by reason of nonownership of stock at the time of the transaction); it then
should automatically fulfill the requirements of section 16(b).
76
The transaction being "unlawful," a person violating subsection (c) is subject
to criminal liability under section 32(a). A full discussion of the applicability of this
latter section will be found in Herlands, "Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934," 21 VA. L. REv. 139 (1934).
77
Or, within five days after the sale, deposit the security in the mails or other
usual channels of transportation. The prohibition of sales against the box, other than
as required by the ordinary exigencies of business, is subject to the proviso that a person
will not be subject to liability if he proves that despite his exercise of good faith he was
unable to make delivery within the required time or that to do so would have caused
undue inconvenience or expense.
18
A sale against the box consists of selling a part or all of one's holdings in a given
security but, instead of delivering the securities owned, borrowing others and delivering
them. As a technical operation the sale against the box follows the same form as other
short sales. But considered in the light of the seller's position, it is the liquidation of
a long position since he has the securities in his possession. This is said, by the advocates
of short selling, to be desirable practice because it permits the seller to maintain control
over his actual securities while at the same time hedging against a decline in price.
The Twentieth Century Fund economists have this to say about such sales:
"There is certainly very little to be said in favor of the practice. If the seller is a small
stockholder there can be no material advantage in its use since in either case (1) his
interest is decreased to the same extent, and (2) the costs of his 'borrowed' sale are
just as great and may be greater than an outright sale. If the seller is a large stockholder,
which is more likely to be the case, the practice is at best deceptive. In its worst setting
it may be done by a director or official of the corporation presenting a front of good
faith and confidence and through the rear door getting out from under or even going
fhort." TwENTJETH CENTURY FUND, INc., THE SECURITY MARKETS 362 (1935).
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to one school of thought, have a detrimental influence on the market,79
Herein, then, lies the explanation for the adoption of a criminal sanction for use in controlling this type of operation whereas a civil sanction was deemed a sufficient control of the operations under the purview of section I 6 (b).
The remaining possible trading activity of officers, directors and
substantial stockholders upon which the heavy hand of regulation
falls is arbitrage transactions. Where a security is traded in more than
one market, there is always the possibility of a variance in the price
of the identical security in the two different markets. Arbitrage transactions involve a simultaneous buying and selling on the two different
markets. The transactions may be effected merely with the aim of
stabilizing the markets in the security, or they may be entered into
solely because of the profit motive. The Securities Exchange Act, in
section I 6 ( d), has exempted arbitrage transactions from the operation
of section 16, subject to such rules and regulations as the commission
may prescribe. The commission has promulgated a rule 80 under subsection (d) in which it has recognized that, absent the profit motive,
arbitrage transactions are not noxious and may be economically justifiable. The rule prohibits any officer or director from engaging in any
foreign or domestic arbitrage transaction in an equity security of his
corporation,81 unless he reports the transaction under section I 6 (a)
and accounts for the profits resulting therefrom under subsection (b).
The rule applies only to officers and directors and exempts the transactions from the operation of subsection ( c). Thus it results that the
management of a company can stabilize the trading in the shares of
their company on the different markets but are not permitted to make a
profit out of the operation.
There can be, and is, little· quarrel over the desirability of the
disclosure requirements of part (a) in section I 6 of the Securities Exchange Act, the prohibition of short sales and sales against the box in
part ( c), or the restriction of arbitrage transactions to their ':IBeful eco79
The Securities Exchange Act embodies the economic philosophy of those who
consider unregulated short selling detrimental to the market. As a result, short sales
and sales against the box by any person are subject to the regulation and supervision of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. See, Securities Exchange Act, § 10 (a) and
SEC Rules X-10A-1, X-10A-2.
80
SEC Rule X-16D-1.
81
The rule applies, of course, only when the issuer corporation has an equity
security listed on a national securities exchange. Then, all equity securities of that
issuer are subject to the rule.
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nomic function. However, subsection (b), with its blanket prohibition of
trading continues to be attacked by financial leaders and by lawyers. 82
The prediction of some, that the enactment of subsection (b) would
result in a wholesale resignation of directors in the larger corporations
the country over, has not materialized. But the fact that enlightened,
intelligent leaders in the financial world are practically unanimous in
their desire for a repeal of the subsection is at least a factor to be considered in determining whether it is the proper solution of the problem it was designed to solve. Unquestionably it is the roughness of the
arbitrary rule of thumb-the six months standard-which causes all the
disquietude. For, the provision includes purchases and sales which may
occur within the six; months period entirely properly and not at all in
reliance upon-inside information; on the other hand, it fails to cover
any case where a security is held for more than six months and then
sold on the basis of inside information. It is said that the difficulties of
tailoring a remedy to fit the need are not justification for covering all,
good and bad, with a blanket prohibition. The question remains simply
this-are the thistles so thick that it is necessary to burn the grain to
kill the thistles? Or, is the grain worth saving?
82

For example, see report of representatives representing seventeen national securities exchanges recommending that section 16(b) be repealed and adverse reaction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission thereto. WALL STREET JouRNAL, March 14, 15,
16, 17, 1939.

